Volkswagen´s quest to increase shareholder value: the carve-out of traton by Schoch, Oliver Paul
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s degree in 





VOLKSWAGEN’S QUEST TO INCREASE SHAREHOLDER VALUE: 











Work project carried out under the supervision of: 







Volkswagen’s Quest to Increase Shareholder Value: The Carve-Out of Traton 
Abstract 
The following case study focuses on Volkswagen’s attempt to increase shareholder value by 
separately listing its truck subsidiary Traton at the stock exchange in 2019. The management 
assumed that Volkswagen suffered from a conglomerate discount. However, a valuation dis-
count could have also been attributable to the company’s questionable ESG track record. In 
addition to evaluating what might be the real cause of the suspected discount, this case study 
examines which type of separation would fit the company’s goal to increase shareholder value 
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Volkswagen’s Quest to Increase Shareholder Value: The Carve-Out of Traton 
Intro 
It was a rainy Monday morning in June 2019 when Frank Witter, Volkswagen’s Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO), got ready to make a big public announcement. The German company was to 
declare its intent to list its Munich-based truck subsidiary Traton separately at the stock 
exchange. It would constitute one of Europe’s biggest initial public offerings (IPO) of the year 
and represent a complete novelty: The world’s largest automotive company would trim its 
empire and at least partially separate from one of its largest subsidiaries.  
“With today’s announcement, Volkswagen and its subsidiary TRATON open a new chapter. 
We are committed to continue to create value for our shareholders. TRATON is a prime 
example of how we want to create that value – by focusing on the core of our business and 
what is best for our stakeholders. It was the right decision to strengthen the independence of 
our commercial vehicles business. We are delivering step by step on our promise to prepare 
the Volkswagen Group for the future.I“ 
Volkswagen (VW) was determined to have Traton listed by the end of the month. The 
management hoped to increase the company’s valuation through the separate listing as it 
believed that part of Traton’s full value was buried under the VW automotive conglomerate. 
But was the hidden value large enough to justify a separation, or would a loss of synergies 
outweigh the benefit? Did VW even suffer from a substantial conglomerate discount or did its 
stock performance mainly suffer from its questionable ESG (Environmental, Social, and 
Governance) performance? Could a carve-out of Traton free the truck subsidiary of a potential 
ESG discount that investors potentially incorporated into VW’s valuation? 
Volkswagen - Background 
Company Overview 
With almost 665,000 employees at the end of 2018, VW was one of the world’s largest 
corporate employers. It sold 10.8 million (m) vehicles during the fiscal year of 2018, making it 
the world’s largest automotive company, and it generated over 217 billion (bn) EUR in 
revenueII. VW’s portfolio consisted of twelve well-known brands under which the company 
sold almost every type of vehicle, including passenger cars, sports and luxury cars, motorcycles, 
and trucks. The structure of the VW Group is illustrated in Exhibit 1. The company’s financials 
are summarized in Exhibit 2-6. 
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Volkswagen’s Origins  
The automotive pioneer was founded by the Nazi regime in 1937 after engineer Ferdinand 
Porsche pitched a small and affordable car to the Reich Ministry of Transport in 1934. His pitch 
was called a “memorandum on the construction of a German People’s Car (deutscher 
Volkswagen)”III. The Nazi regime wanted to make the car manufacturer part of its industrial 
policy for job creation and built a massive production plant in a town which is nowadays called 
Wolfsburg. However, as the plant was mainly used to produce military equipment during the 
Second World War, VW’s initial ‘People’s Car’ was only produced in large quantities after the 
war had ended. The car was ultimately named VW Beetle and became an international success, 
with more than 15m units built until 1972IV.  
The company became the car manufacturer with most units sold in Europe in 1985 after 
introducing popular cars such as the Polo, Golf, and Passat. As competition in the automotive 
industry became more intense, the company tried to sustain itself by further expanding and 
undertook multiple acquisitions. The multi-brand strategy enabled VW to provide cars to a 
diverse set of customers, which helped the company establish itself as the world-leading 
automotive companyV. A timeline of important acquisitions is depicted in Exhibit 7. 
The Porsche-Piëch Family’s Influence on Volkswagen 
Ferdinand Porsche’s son founded the sports car manufacturer Porsche AG. His descendants, 
the Porsche-Piëch clan, handed over operational responsibility to external managers, which is 
why family member Ferdinand Piëch started working for VW instead of Porsche. He became 
CEO of VW in 1993 and changed positions to become chairman of VW’s supervisory board in 
2002VI. Diverging family interests led to an unusual situation in which Porsche AG tried to 
acquire VW through a separate holding company called Porsche Automobil Holding SE 
between 2005 and 2009. The acquisition attempt failed as Porsche was too highly leveraged. 
The situation culminated in VW, under the leadership of Ferdinand Piëch, acquiring the sports 
car manufacturer instead and integrating it into its extensive brand portfolioVII.  
Despite the failed takeover attempt, the Porsche-Piëch family ended up holding the majority of 
voting rights in VW AG by holding all voting rights in Porsche Automobil Holding SEVIII. The 
family’s influence on VW is depicted in Exhibit 8. VW’s complex shareholder structure is 
illustrated in Exhibit 9 and 10. The company had a dual-class shareholder structure with about 
295m ordinary and 206m preferred shares. While only ordinary shares carried voting rights, 
owners of preferred shares were entitled to a slightly higher dividendIX.  
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Expansion into the Truck Business 
The company which Ferdinand Piëch’s grandfather, Ferdinand Porsche, once created was now 
under family control. But Piëch was determined to extend the VW empire further. His 
acquisition targets, however, had nothing to do with VW’s initial core product, cars for the 
common people. Having already owned a stake in the Swedish truck manufacturer Scania, VW 
took majority control of it in 2008. In 2014, VW owned 63% of Scania and acquired the truck 
manufacturer’s remaining shares for 6.7bn EURX. The automotive giant then gained a majority 
stake in German truck manufacturer MAN in 2011. Ferdinand Piëch had the goal of building a 
truck empire by combining the two brands and continued to increase VW’s stake in MAN. With 
MAN’s acquisition, VW also welcomed back its South American truck business, Volkswagen 
Caminhões e Ônibus, which it had previously sold to the German truck manufacturerXI.  
Following an internal power struggle, Piëch ultimately lost support in VW’s supervisory board 
and resigned from all his positions at VW AG in April 2014. In 2017, he cut all remaining ties 
with the company by selling his stake in the Porsche Holding SE to other family membersXII.  
ESG Concerns about Volkswagen 
Environmental Track Record: The Dieselgate 
In 2015, it was revealed that VW committed one of the largest automotive scandals in history. 
The United States (US) Environmental Protection Agency uncovered that VW had used 
software to make it appear as if their cars complied with emission regulations when, in fact, 
they exhausted 10 to 40 times the legal level of nitrogen oxide. After the agency came forward, 
VW’s stock lost more than a third of its value in only a couple of daysXIII. Consequently, the 
automotive giant faced numerous court and governmental proceedings all over the world. The 
scandal’s resolution was still ongoing in 2019 and cost VW more than 28bn EUR in fines and 
other costs related to the incident until the end of 2018XIV.  
After the harsh backlash from the Dieselgate, VW decided to accelerate its electric car efforts. 
By 2025, every fourth car in its product portfolio was supposed to be electricXV. In 2019, 
however, the company was far away from becoming a pioneer in alternative drives. Of the 
10.1m cars which VW sold in the previous fiscal year, only about 50,000 had been electricXVI. 
Industry-wide, around 2.1m of the total 68.7m passenger cars sold globally in 2018 had been 
electric. With 1.1m electric car sales, China was the most important market so far, whereas 
Europe was lagging with only 385,000XVII.  
4 
To combat climate change, the European Commission decided on much stricter emission 
regulations from 2021 onwards. Manufacturers will not be allowed to exceed an average 
emission of 95g/km from their cars sold in Europe. Otherwise, financial penalties will be 
enforced. The European Union’s (EU) CO2 regulations will be the toughest worldwide and were 
expected to increase electric car sales substantiallyXVIII. VW’s average CO2 emissions per new 
car registration in Europe had remained around 121g/km since 2015XIX. The company’s electric 
car strategy (illustrated in Exhibit 11) would need to succeed for VW to avoid paying hefty 
fines once again.  
Social Standing: Volkswagen’s Image Problem 
Not only did VW pollute the environment, but it also cheated its customers by selling defective 
products. Overall, more than 11m Volkswagen (brand), Audi and Porsche cars, built between 
2009 and 2016, were affectedXX. While VW had to offer buybacks and compensation in the US, 
it could modify affected cars in Germany through inexpensive software updatesXXI. However, 
more than 300,000 German VW car owners were not satisfied with the company’s reparation 
approach. They were part of lawsuits against the vehicle manufacturer, which were still ongoing 
in 2019XXII. Furthermore, the extra pollution generated by VW’s rigged cars could contribute 
to more than 1,200 premature deaths in Europe alone, as scientists at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology estimatedXXIII. VW’s former reputation as a high-quality car maker was 
tarnished. In 2016, American market research company Nielsen conducted a brand image 
survey among 100 global brands in which VW received the worst rankingXXIV.  
In 2013, the German newspaper Wirtschaftswoche accused VW of supporting the increasing 
discrimination of the government of Chinese province Xinjiang against the region’s Muslim 
minority of Uighurs. VW had opened a factory in Xinjiang and apparently gave in to the 
Chinese regime and mostly refrained from recruiting Uighurs as employeesXXV. In April 2019, 
shortly before the Traton IPO, the company’s questionable operations in China came back into 
public focus when a BBC reporter confronted VW Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Herbert 
Diess with the verified existence of re-education camps in the region where hundreds of 
thousands of Uighurs were forcefully held. Diess merely stated that he “was not aware” of the 
existence of such camps. Members of the German parliament reacted shocked about his 
apparent ignorance as international media extensively reported the issueXXVI.  
VW’s handling of business in countries with dictatorial regimes was not only in particular 
public focus due to the company’s exploitation of slave workers during the Second World War 
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but also because the state of Qatar, which was known for its horrible human rights abuses, was 
one of VW’s most influential shareholdersXXVII. During the fiscal year of 2018, VW sold almost 
40% of its vehicles in China and was dependent on the market as only few other multinational 
corporationsXXVIII. The company could not risk threatening its successful operations in the 
country and relied on continued collaboration with the Chinese regime. For large Western 
companies, which operate in key industries, to be allowed to operate in China, they typically 
had to form joint ventures with Chinese companiesXXIX. VW received 3.3bn EUR in dividends 
from its Chinese joint ventures with Chinese state-controlled car manufacturers FAW and SAIC 
in 2018XXX.  
Corporate Governance and Culture at Volkswagen 
VW’s repressive corporate culture was regarded as one of the main drivers of the emission 
scandal. Employees reported a “culture of fear” in the company under Ferdinand Piëch and 
former CEO Martin Winterkorn. Constant performance pressure led to fear of missing goals 
and admitting mistakes. Employees reported that they felt forced to pursue illegal actions in 
their operations to meet the ambitious targets and to avoid repercussionsXXXI. Furthermore, 
although there was a whistle-blower system in place within VW, other employees looked away 
and did not report the misconductXXXII. Another enabling factor for the incident was the 
company’s highly centralized decision-making process and top-down organizational structure. 
The headquarters in Wolfsburg dictated performance goals to the Group without listening much 
to managers in the lower hierarchy ranksXXXIII.  
Following the incident, VW was forced to overhaul its compliance system. In resolving the 
emission scandal in the US, VW agreed to be monitored by former US Deputy Attorney General 
Larry Thompson. He began his job as VW’s monitor in 2017 and was supposed to keep an eye 
on VW’s efforts to achieve a better corporate culture and establish an effective compliance 
system. At least until 2020, he would monitor VW and would need to certify that VW’s control 
system had fundamentally improved before leaving the company. Among other measures, 
internal training was supposed to promote law-compliant and moral actions to employeesXXXIV. 
Conflicts of interest can be seen as a further enabling factor and arose from VW’s board 
composition. VW had a two-tier board in place, which consisted of a management board and a 
supervisory board. The supervisory board consisted of ten shareholder representatives and ten 
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employee representatives1. As of 2019, five of the shareholder representatives had been 
appointed by the Porsche-Piëch family, two by the state of Lower Saxony, and two by Qatar 
Holding LLC. VW’s board was accused of lacking independence. “We are critical of the 
composition of the supervisory board. (...) VW interprets independence very generously”, said 
Michael Schmidt, CEO of German fund manager Deka in 2018XXXV. Hans Hirt, director at the 
UK activist investor Hermes Equity Ownership Services, regarded VW as one of “the most 
complicated and questionably governed companiesXXXVI”.  
The board’s composition did not even fundamentally change after the emission scandal was 
uncovered. Hans Dieter Pötsch was appointed as the new chairperson of the company’s 
supervisory board, which was heavily criticized by analysts as he was already part of the 
supervisory board when the scandal occurredXXXVII. Furthermore, Pötsch was also chairman of 
Porsche Automobil Holding SE, meaning that the family’s tough grip on the company 
continued. VW’s boards are illustrated in Exhibit 12-13. The German Corporate Governance 
Code’s definition of an independent supervisory board member is stated in Exhibit 14. 
A further thorn in investors’ side was the so-called “VW law”, which cemented the state’s 
influence on VW. The German law was set in place when the German government privatized 
the carmaker. To prevent a hostile takeover, the law dictated regulations for Volkswagen that 
deviated from the regular German Stock Corporation Act. As of 2019, key shareholder meeting 
decisions, which generally required a three-quarters majority, required more than 80% 
approval. Hence, the State of Lower Saxony was basically granted a veto right. Furthermore, 
the law stipulated that decisions regarding production plants needed the supervisory board’s 
approval with a two-thirds majority, meaning that the management could not move production 
to low-wage countries against the will of the employee representativesXXXVIII.  
Potential Impact of Public ESG Concerns on Volkswagen’s Stock Price  
Since 2015, Volkswagen’s ESG ratings had been continuously declining. A definition of ESG 
factors is given in Exhibit 15. VW’s historical performance in the three ESG categories, 
according to ESG research company Sustainalytics, is outlined in Exhibit 16-18. Already in 
May 2015, before the reveal of the emission scandal, market research company and index 
provider, MSCI, dropped VW from its ACWI ESG Index, the ESG friendly version of its 
 
1 In German companies with more than 2000 employees, half of the supervisory board seats must be filled with 
representatives from the works councils and unions. However, the chairperson of the supervisory board possesses 
the power to overrule employee representatives as his / her vote is counted twice in case of a tie.  
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flagship global equity index “All Country World Index”, due to the company’s questionable 
corporate governance. After the reveal of the emission scandal, MSCI Research downgraded 
VW’s ESG rating from BBB to CCC, its worst possible rating, which the company still held in 
2019XXXIX. MSCI’s overall ESG rating of VW, compared with other European car 
manufacturers, is depicted in Exhibit 19.  
It seems reasonable that VW’s ESG performance was not viewed particularly positively by 
investors, but did it lead to a discount on its stock price? The company’s negative ESG 
performance at least directly exposed its future cash flow to multiple risks. The emission 
scandal had a devastating impact on VW’s stock performance, and insufficient change in the 
company’s corporate governance and culture could enable further incidents. Furthermore, state 
influence and strong unions could make future cost-saving initiatives hard to implement. Also, 
Volkswagen’s bad image could increasingly deter customers, especially if further scandals 
would arise. Most importantly, the company was lagging behind in alternative drives. If its 
electric vehicle strategy would fail, it could lose its status as the world’s largest carmaker.  
When Giese et al. (2019) researched companies from the MSCI World index according to their 
MSCI ESG rating, they found that high ESG ratings coincided with, on average, higher 
company valuations, while low ESG ratings coincided with lower valuations. They also found 
evidence of significantly higher profitability of the top ESG-rated quintile compared to the 
lowest ESG-rated quintile. Furthermore, the worst ESG quintile had a significantly higher 
number of companies during the research period that suffered from incidents leading to a more 
than 95% cumulative loss over the next three years than the best ESG quintileXL. Hoepner et al. 
(2017) observed statistically significant lower downside risk measures such as volatility and 
worst-case loss in companies with a high ESG ratingXLI.  
When we look at stock performance, the MSCI ACWI ESG Leaders Index, which includes the 
highest ESG rated companies from each sector, outperformed its parent index by thirteen 
percentage points from October 2015 (since Bloomberg tracks the index) to June 2019, as 
detailed in Exhibit 20. Furthermore, a survey from consulting firm McKinsey, conducted 
among senior executives and investment professionals, indicated that in case of an acquisition, 
they would be willing to pay about 10% median premium for a company with a good ESG 
record over one with a negativeXLII. Lastly, institutional investors increasingly favor ESG-
compliant corporations as those criteria have become more important for society. In an OECD 
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survey conducted in 2019, 80% of participating pension funds and 58% of insurance companies 
responded that they incorporate ESG factors into their investment decisionsXLIII. 
Global Truck Industry 
Industry Overview 
The global truck industry consists of companies that develop, manufacture and service  
light-, medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. The light-duty segment starts with trucks that weigh 
3.5 tons or more, while heavy-duty trucks weigh at least 15 tonsXLIV. Most truck manufacturers 
also offer other commercial vehicles that require similar components like trucks, such as buses, 
special-purpose vehicles (e.g. dump trucks, firefighting trucks), military vehicles, and 
construction vehicles. In addition, truck manufacturers often sell engines and power trains for 
marine, military, and industrial applications. Trucks differ vastly from passenger cars, as buying 
decisions from commercial clients are less of an emotional nature than an economic decision. 
Hence, the key measure from a customer’s point of view is total cost of ownership. Total cost 
of ownership consists of the acquisition, financing, operation, and disposal of the truck. 
Operating costs include driver and fuel costs, which accounted for approximately 45% and 
30%, respectively, making it by far the largest cost component. As acquisition cost is only one 
of several cost components, truck manufacturers usually offer further services, including 
maintenance and repair, fleet management services, and financial servicesXLV.  
Industry Outlook 
In 2019, the truck industry was in the middle of a massive disruption with key trends including 
electrification & alternative fuels, digitalization, and autonomous driving. Demand for 
electrification, alternative fuels and fuel efficiency was driven by regulatory requirements and 
total cost of ownership. Regulatory emission requirements were mainly focused on nitrogen 
oxide (NOx) and carbon dioxide (CO2). According to McKinsey estimates, electric trucks will 
have significantly and hydrogen trucks slightly lower ownership costs than diesel trucks in 
2030XLVI. Regulation-wise, the EU had some of the world’s strictest standards in place, with 
only the US and Japan demanding even lower nitrogen oxide emission levels.  
Furthermore, from 2025 onwards, truck manufacturers in the EU will have to reduce their fleet-
wide average CO2 emissions by 15% compared to the average during a reference period in 
2019. By 2030, the CO2 emission reduction will need to exceed 30%. Harsh financial penalties 
will be enforced on manufacturers in case of non-compliance. As the EU’s 2030 CO2 emission 
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targets were thought to be impossible to achieve with traditional diesel engines, massive 
investment into alternative drives will be required from truck manufacturersXLVII. Due to driver 
costs being the second-largest component of the total cost of truck ownership, autonomous 
driving is likely to have a tremendous impact on the industry. McKinsey expected first use cases 
of fully autonomous trucks driving on selected roads and highways as soon as 2025. 
Digitalization would mainly focus on the connectivity of trucks to increase supply chain 
efficiency through data collection, sharing, and analysis. Connected trucks also gave truck 
manufacturers further opportunities for aftersales services to increase revenueXLVIII. 
Competition 
Traton’s largest competitors in the European market were Daimler (which was a conglomerate 
with a passenger car and a truck business itself) and AB Volvo. While Traton accounted for 
28% of medium and heavy-duty truck sales in Western Europe in 2017, Daimler accounted for 
22%, and AB Volvo for 16%XLIX. However, Daimler and Volo were ahead of Traton as far as 
worldwide unit sales were concerned because they also sold trucks in North America and Asia, 
where Traton was not as active at the time. Daimler, the world’s largest truck maker, sold over 
half a million trucks and buses in 2018, which was more than double Traton’s unit salesL.  
Traton – Background 
Company Overview 
Traton included the commercial vehicle manufacturers Scania, MAN, and VW Caminhões e 
Ônibus (VWCO). Each Traton brand operated its own distribution network, used vehicle 
business and aftersales business to ensure an individual customer approach. The financial 
services businesses of MAN and VWCO were combined under the roof of VW Financial 
Services, while Scania operated its own. In addition, Traton managed its digital service offer 
RIO under a separate business unit. Exhibit 21 shows trucks from Traton’s brands, while the 
brands themselves are described in Exhibit 22. The Group structure is illustrated in Exhibit 
23.  
Traton’s three truck manufacturers catered to different customer segments: While Scania 
operated in the premium segment, MAN manufactured trucks for the mass market. VWCO 
catered to the budget segment in emerging markets and developing countriesLI. In total, the 
Group operated 29 production and assembly sites globally and sold 223,000 trucks and buses 
during the fiscal year of 2018, an increase of 14% compared to the year before. In 2018, Traton 
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generated nearly 26bn EUR and earned 1.4bn EUR in net incomeLII. The Group’s financials are 
summarized in Exhibit 24-27. Detailed financial information about each brand is outlined in 
Exhibit 28-29. Vehicle unit sales information of each brand is provided in Exhibit 30. 
Traton’s Origins 
In 2015, while VW was in the middle of the emission scandal crisis, it finally combined its 
truck manufacturers under one roof and created the VW Truck & Bus Holding as a wholly-
owned subsidiaryLIII. For the new business unit, the company managed to recruit Andreas 
Renschler from its competitor Daimler. Renschler had previously worked for Daimler for more 
than 25 years and had spent 9 of those in the company’s truck business, which he established 
as the world market leaderLIV. Under his leadership, MAN and Scania, as well as VWCO, were 
working closely together. Similarly, as in VW’s passenger car business, where the brands 
developed many car parts jointly to save costs, the truck business introduced Group-wide 
procurement and joint development of components such as engines and transmissionsLV.  
Renschler was not only focusing on internal efficiency improvements. Through global 
partnerships, he aimed to benefit from higher power train production volumes as well as joint 
development and procurement. Renschler signed cooperation agreements with US truck 
manufacturer Navistar and Chinese Sinotruk (in both of which Traton held shares), as well as 
Japanese Hino Motors. Renschler had the ambition to make VW’s truck business a “global 
champion”LVI. In addition to partnerships, he considered acquisitions and an aggressive 
expansion into the North American and Asian markets to increase market sizeLVII. Traton’s 
global expansion strategy is illustrated in Exhibit 31. 
In 2018, VW began to prepare for a potential separation and changed its subsidiary’s legal form 
into a European GroupLVIII. The unit was also given a new name, Traton, to emphasize the 
emancipation from the parent companyLIX.  
Volkswagen Carves Out it’s Truck Business 
Industry Trend Towards Pure Players 
VW was not the first automotive company to part from its truck business. Renault sold its truck 
business to AB Volvo in 2001, making its stock price surge 5% and Volvo’s 8% on the 
announcement dayLX. AB Volvo did it the other way round and focused on its truck business 
and sold its passenger car business to Ford in 1999LXI. While not parting from its truck business 
or separately listing it yet, Daimler’s shareholders voted for a complete corporate restructuring 
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in May 2019, after already planning for it since 2017. Daimler AG would act as a publicly listed 
holding company while the passenger car business (Mercedes-Benz AG) and the truck business 
(Daimler Truck AG) would be separate subsidiariesLXII. According to Daimler, the move was 
supposed to give the two enterprises, which aimed at vastly different customer groups, more 
entrepreneurial independence. Analysts, however, regarded it as preparation for a future spin-
offLXIII. 
The Opportunities 
“Bringing together our commercial vehicle brands under one roof means we can focus more 
strongly on the needs of the truck and bus business and can therefore accelerate the decision-
making process”, Renschler stated after being appointed as head of VW’s commercial vehicles 
unitLXIV. He viewed the truck business’s newly gained autonomy as necessary to make the 
company the world’s largest truck manufacturer. Renschler planned further acquisitions and 
partnerships for Traton to reduce the dependence on the European and South American markets 
(Traton’s revenue by region is summarized in Exhibit 32). A separate listing of Traton would 
allow the company to use its stock as an acquisition currency, which meant that shareholders 
of acquisition targets could receive Traton stock as compensation for tendering their sharesLXV.  
The ambitious manager was supported by the new VW CEO Herbert Diess who was appointed 
in April 2018 to finally resolve the emission scandal for good and push forward the Group’s 
fleet’s electrification. Diess and CFO Frank Witter were unwilling to allocate the necessary 
cash to Traton for Renschler’s expensive expansion plans. VW already faced too many 
challenges in the passenger car business. With governments worldwide urging the automotive 
industry to shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy, VW started investing heavily in electric 
cars. Moreover, changing consumer preferences required cars to become digitally integrated. 
To defend its title as the world’s largest automotive company, VW planned to spend 44bn EUR 
through 2023 on electric and connected carsLXVI.  
Besides the need to allocate cash more efficiently, VW management had to admit that it could 
never realize the synergies between passenger car and truck business, which it had expected in 
the past. In fact, trucks and passenger cars required very different parts, engines, and 
distribution channels. The powertrain of a truck was typically the largest cost component. 
Hence, joint procurement and development among the Traton brands and partnerships with 
other truck manufacturers were more promising than tight collaboration with the other VW 
brandsLXVII.  
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According to investment bank Evercore, at the beginning of 2019, VW was only valued at 
around 5.3 times its expected earnings for 2019. The average company valuation in the German 
stock index Dax was more than twice as highLXVIII. Renowned automotive analysts Arndt 
Ellinghorst suspected that VW suffered from a conglomerate discount and that the true value 
of Traton could have been buried under VW. Such a discount would imply that VW’s twelve 
brands were valued less if combined than they would be if separate, as investors generally prefer 
companies with a clearly defined business. Ellinghorst calculated in a “sum-of-the-parts”-
analysis that VW’s brands could be valued at up to 220bn Euro if listed as separate entities, 
which would be about triple what VW was valued at mid-2019LXIX. In his analysis of VW, 
which he published in January 2019 for the research company Evercore ISI, he stated: “We 
believe VW should consider a holding company model with minority listings of its key brands. 
This would not only lift material hidden value, it would also improve corporate governance by 
increasing transparency and accountability across the Group. Plus it would protect industrial 
collaboration across the various Group brands.LXX” The performance of VW’s stock price is 
illustrated in Exhibit 33. Ellinghorst’s sum of the parts analysis of VW is given in Exhibit 34.  
Frank Witter shared Ellinghorst’s perception. In March 2019, in a presentation to investors, he 
stated that an IPO of Traton would help reduce VW’s conglomerate discount and overall 
complexity in the GroupLXXI. On paper, the idea sounded very promising. Truck manufacturers 
generally attracted a higher valuation at the stock market than car manufacturersLXXII. Before 
the IPO, investors might have simply valued Traton with the same multiples they valued VW 
as the truck business was relatively small compared to VW’s passenger car business and 
accounted for less than 11% of the Group’s total revenueLXXIII. Therefore, a separate listing of 
Traton could have uncovered additional value by forcing investors to fully value the truck 
holding. The financial information of comparable companies from the commercial vehicle and 
passenger car industry is summarized in Exhibit 35 and 36. VW’s financial information 
exclusive of its subsidiary Traton is outlined in Exhibit 37 to 40. 
Furthermore, as Ellinghorst mentioned, Traton’s increased autonomy could improve the truck 
holding’s corporate governance. As Traton’s entities were not involved in the emission scandal, 
a separation could therefore free it from a potential ESG discount.  
The Risks 
For Traton to be freed of a potential ESG discount, investors would need to regard the truck 
holding as an independent company that would not be subject to directions and questionable 
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corporate governance from the VW headquarters in Wolfsburg. However, Traton’s corporate 
governance did not look too different from VW’s. Hans Dieter Pötsch, chairman of VW’s 
supervisory board, was also appointed as chairman of Traton’s supervisory board. Including 
him, four of the ten shareholder representative seats were filled with appointees from the 
Porsche-Piëch family. Three other shareholder representatives were part of VW’s management 
board, which increased the risk of a conflict of interests. Traton’s board composition is 
illustrated in Exhibit 41 and 42. Moreover, while Traton was not part of the settlement with 
the US authorities, it still had to comply with the monitor’s recommendationsLXXIV. 
Furthermore, Andreas Renschler, CEO of Traton, was also on the management board of VW. 
Unlike the rest of Traton’s management board, which was bound by service agreements with 
the company itself, Renschler would still be bound by a VW service agreement following the 
IPO. The company merely rendered his services to Traton, meaning that Renschler received 
this remuneration directly from VW. Renschler’s remuneration was similar to the rest of the 
management board’s compensation as it consisted of a flat compensation, a performance-
related bonus, and a long-term performance incentive. However, Renschler’s bonus was linked 
to VW’s performance and the performance of VW’s preferred stock over a three-year period. 
The rest of the management board’s variable remuneration component was linked to the 
performance of Traton insteadLXXV. Renschler’s remuneration is described in detail in Exhibit 
43. Like VW, Traton’s subsidiaries were heavily unionized. At least, the State of Lower Saxony 
refrained from appointing a politician as a representative and appointed entrepreneur Wolf-
Michael Schmidt instead. Every party involved wanted to prevent valuation loss due to state 
influence on the companyLXXVI.  
Following the IPO, VW would factually dominate Traton according to the German Stock 
Corporation Act (Sections 311 and sequent) as it would continue to hold the majority of the 
company’s shares. This meant that Traton management would be allowed to take VW’s 
interests into accountLXXVII. Unlike VW’s stock, all Traton stock consisted of ordinary shares, 
meaning that the shareholder structure as a percentage of subscribed capital would be 
represented accordingly in the voting rights distributionLXXVIII.  
Despite most parts and components differing vastly between passenger car and truck business, 
Traton’s brands acquired some materials and parts, such as cabin interior, via VW’s 
procurement platform to save money in purchasing through VW’s purchasing power. VW and 
Traton tried to mitigate the risk of losing procurement synergies by signing an agreement that 
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allowed for continued access to VW’s procurement platform following the IPO. All services 
provided by VW AG would be subject to fees for Traton’s brands, but Traton would continue 
to enjoy similar procurement synergies with VW as before the IPO. Similar agreements existed 
regarding human resources (e.g. company cars) and information technology (e.g. data centers) 
services. While the service agreements were expected to continue as long VW held a majority 
in Traton, the subsidiary could lose out on valuable procurement synergies if the ownership 
structure would changeLXXIX. In addition, MAN’s and VWCO’s financial services business 
would continue to be part of VW Financial ServicesLXXX. 
Moreover, the truck and the passenger car industry were both disrupted by demand for 
alternative drives, digitalization, and autonomous driving. As a separate entity, the truck 
holding company would be reliant on VW’s intent for joint-development and its partnerships 
with other truck manufacturers to be able to make the necessary investments to stay competitive 
in a more challenging market and regulatory environment. Prior to the IPO, Scania and MAN 
participated in VW’s research and development by paying an annual fee based on their revenue. 
Traton expected to continue research and development agreements with VW, which it deemed 
commercially beneficial for the company as long as VW would control itLXXXI.  
The Type of Separation 
Another question concerning Herbert Diess and mainly CFO Frank Witter was how to separate 
Traton from VW. The three most common options for separating a business unit are a sale, an 
equity carve-out, and a corporate spin-off. In an equity carve-out, a company sells existing 
shares or additional shares of the new separate entity as part of an IPO. Depending on the 
number of shares sold, the company can stay in control of the carved-out entity and receives 
cashLXXXII. The equity carve-out is an alternative to a complete sale of a business unit. It can be 
used when no adequate acquirer is found, when the management thinks that potential acquirers 
undervalue the business unit or when the management wants to remain a strategic investor in 
the business unit and is mainly interested in uncovering hidden value.  
In a spin-off, ownership of the subsidiary is transferred to the investors on a pro-rata basis. It 
can be used if a company does not intend to remain in control of the subsidiary following the 
separation. Also, investors are not exposed to the risk of bad timing due to a potentially weak 
market environment, unlike when existing stock is sold in an equity carve-outLXXXIII. VW 
finally opted for an equity carve-out and would hence receive cash that it could use to tackle its 
challenges in the passenger car business.  
15 
The First IPO Attempt 
VW’s management initially wanted the IPO to take place before easter 2019. However, the 
management cancelled the IPO due to a weak market environment. In 2019, the trade war 
between the United States of America and the EU and China continued to escalate, which hurt 
global supply chains and increased uncertainty for investors. US President Donald Trump 
threatened the EU with tariffs on European-made vehicles during negotiations. Also, the 
European Central Bank cut its gross domestic product (GDP) growth target for the Euro area 
for 2019 from 1.7% to 1.1% in MarchLXXXIV. The weak economic outlook made it hard to 
achieve a high valuation at the market for an export-oriented company like Traton. The overall 
deal value of IPOs shrunk by more than 60% globally to 20bn EUR in the first quarter of 2019 
compared to the same period in the previous year. While 291 companies ventured onto the 
trading floors in the first quarter of 2018, only 179 did so in 2019LXXXV. The performance of 
the global IPO market prior to Traton’s listing is illustrated in Exhibit 44. 
When the stock market and global IPO environment changed for the better during the second 
quarter of 2019, Diess pushed June 2019 through as the final IPO date. Nevertheless, VW was 
confronted with lower than anticipated demand. The management decided that it would only 
offer 10% of Traton shares, instead of the 25% it was previously willing to sell, in an attempt 
to keep the valuation at a level which it viewed as fairLXXXVI. In Exhibit 45, past and forecasted 
GDP growth of the Euro area is illustrated. 
The Second IPO Attempt 
Frank Witter scheduled the IPO of Traton for the 28th of July of 2019. Traton would be dual-
listed in Stockholm (as Scania was based in Sweden) and Frankfurt. The base offer consisted 
of 50m existing shares, which would be sold by VW. As there would be a total of 500m 
outstanding shares, VW was selling 10% of its stake in Traton. In the case of high demand, an 
over-allotment of up to 7.5m existing shares was possible through the responsible investment 
banks’ exercise of the greenshoe optionLXXXVII.  
Frank Witter wondered how he and his team of financial experts, together with the investment 
banks (listed in Exhibit 46), should value Traton for the IPO. Furthermore, Witter wanted to 
examine some concerns more closely. Would investors free Traton from potential ESG and 
conglomerate discounts? Should VW go through with selling existing shares, or would another 
way of listing Traton, for instance, in a corporate spin-off, be better suited? And finally: Would 
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Appendix Ⅰ: Case Study Exhibits 
Exhibit 1: Volkswagen Group Structure as of December 31, 2018 
 
Source: Volkswagen AG 
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Exhibit 2: Volkswagen Income Statement 
 Fiscal Year ended December 31, 
In Millions of EUR  2016 2017 2018 
Revenue 217,267.00  229,550.00  235,849.00  
 / Cost of Revenue (176,270.00) (186,001.00) (189,500.00) 
Gross Profit 40,997.00  43,549.00  46,349.00  
Other Operating Income 9,311.00  10,116.00  10,487.00  
 / Operating Expenses (43,205.00) (39,847.00) (42,916.00) 
Operating Income (Loss) 7,103.00  13,818.00  13,920.00  
Interest Income 642.00  951.00  967.00  
Income from Affiliates 3,497.00  3,482.00  3,369.00  
 / Interest Expense (1,330.00) (2,317.00) (1,547.00) 
 / Other Financial Result (2,620.00) (2,261.00) (1,066.00) 
Pretax Income 7,292.00  13,673.00  15,643.00  
 / Income Tax Expense (Benefit) (1,913.00) (2,210.00) (3,490.00) 
Current Income Tax (3,274.00) (3,205.00) (3,533.00) 
Deferred Income Tax 1,361.00  995.00  43.00  
Income (Loss) from Continued Operations 5,379.00  11,463.00  12,153.00  
Income from Discontinued Operations 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Income (Loss) Incl. Minority Interest 5,379.00  11,463.00  12,153.00  
 / Minority Interest (10.00) (10.00) (17.00) 
Net Income 5,369.00  11,453.00  12,136.00  
 / Attributable to Volkswagen AG Hybrid Capital 
Investors -225.0 -274.0 -309.0 
Net Income Attributable to Volkswagen AG 





Exhibit 3: Volkswagen Balance Sheet 
In Millions of EUR  
As of December 31, 
As of 
March 31, 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Assets         
Noncurrent assets 254,010  262,081  274,620  284,896  
Intangible assets 62,599  63,419  64,613  64,785  
Property, plant and equipment 54,033  55,243  57,630  62,239  
Lease assets 38,439  39,254  43,545  45,354  
Financial services receivables 68,402  73,249  78,692  81,602  
Investments, equity-accounted investments and other equity in-
vestments, other receivables and financial assets 30,537  30,916  30,140  30,917  
Current assets 155,722  160,112  183,536  186,326  
Inventories 38,978  40,415  45,745  49,477  
Financial services receivables 49,673  53,145  54,216  56,250  
Other receivables and financial assets 30,286  32,040  37,557  41,321  
Marketable securities 17,520  15,939  17,080  17,022  
Cash, cash equivalents  19,265  18,457  28,938  22,256  
Assets held for sale – 115  – – 
Total assets 409,732  422,193  458,156  471,222  
          
Equity and liabilities         
Equity 92,910  109,077  117,342  117,507  
Equity attributable to Volkswagen AG shareholders 85,122  97,761  104,522  104,493  
Equity attributable to Volkswagen AG hybrid capital investors 7,567  11,088  12,596  12,525  
Equity attributable to Volkswagen AG shareholders and hybrid 
capital investors 92,689  108,849  117,117  117,019  
Noncontrolling interests 221  229  225  489  
Noncurrent liabilities 139,306  152,726  172,846  186,229  
Noncurrent Financial liabilities  66,358  81,628  101,126  108,811  
Provisions for pensions 33,012  32,730  33,097  37,145  
Other liabilities 39,936  38,368  38,623  40,273  
Current liabilities 177,515  160,389  167,968  167,486  
Put options and compensation rights granted to noncontrolling 
interest shareholders 3,849  3,795  1,853  – 
Current Financial liabilities  88,461  81,844  89,757  83,920  
Trade payables 22,794  23,046  23,607  24,405  
Other liabilities 62,411  51,705  52,750  59,162  
Total equity and liabilities 409,732  422,193  458,156  471,222  
Source: Volkswagen AG 
Exhibit 4: Volkswagen’s Industrial Business Net Financial Debt 
 As of December 31, As of March 31,  
In Millions of EUR  2018 2019 Change 
Cash, cash equivalents 28,938  22,256  (6,682) 
Marketable securities 17,080  17,022  16,820  
Gross liquidity 46,018  39,278  (6,740) 
Total borrowings (190,883) (192,731) (1,848) 
Net liquidity / (net financial debt) (144,865) (153,453) (8,588) 
of which in the Industrial Business segment 24,862  17,076  (7,786) 
Source: Volkswagen AG  
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Exhibit 5: Volkswagen Cash Flow Statement 
 Fiscal Year ended December 31, 
In Millions of EUR  2016 2017 2018 
Cash from Operating Activities       
+ Net Income 5,369  11,453  12,136  
+ Depreciation & Amortization 20,793  22,030  22,391  
+ Non-Cash Items (6,498) (22,222) (11,844) 
+ Change in Non-Cash Working Capital (10,234) (12,447) (15,409) 
+ (Increase) / Decrease in Accounts Receivable (2,155) (1,660) (6,400) 
+ (Increase) / Decrease in Inventories (3,637) (4,198) (5,372) 
+ Increase / (Decrease) in Other (4,442) (6,589) (3,637) 
Net Cash From Discontinued Operations 0  0  0  
Cash from Operating Activities 9,430  (1,186) 7,274  
        
Cash from Investing Activities       
+ Change in Fixed & Intangible Assets (18,551) (17,901) (18,681) 
+ Net Change in Long Term Investment (3,883) 1,711  (2,204) 
+ Net Cash From Acquisitions & Divestitures 1,755  (318) (706) 
+ Other Investing Activities 0  0  (1) 
+ Net Cash From Discontinued Operations 0  0  0  
Cash from Investing Activities (20,679) (16,508) (21,592) 
        
Cash from Financing Activities       
+ Dividends Paid (364) (1,332) (2,375) 
+ Cash From (Repayment) Debt (9,375) 12,374  19,989  
+ Increase in Capital Stock 0  3,473  1,491  
+ Decrease in Capital Stock 0  0  0  
+ Other Financing Activities 19,451  3,110  5,461  
+ Net Cash From Discontinued Operations 0  0  0  
Cash from Financing Activities 9,712  17,625  24,566  
        
+ Effect of Foreign Exchange Rates (91) (727) (173) 
        
Net Changes in Cash (1,628) (796) 10,075  
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Exhibit 6: Market Capitalization of Volkswagen AG 
 As of December 31, 
As of June 3, 
In Millions of EUR  2016 2017 2018 2019 






Exhibit 7: Volkswagen’s Acquisition History 
Year Acquired Vehicle Brand (Sub-)Industry 
1965 Auto Union GmbH (Audi) Passenger Car 
1986 SEAT Passenger Car 
1989 Škoda Passenger Car 
1998 Bentley, Lamborghini and Bugatti Sports and Luxury Car 
2008 Scania Truck and Bus 
2009 Porsche Sports and Luxury Car 
2011 MAN Truck and Bus 
2012 Ducati Motorcycle 
Source: Volkswagen AG 
 
Exhibit 8: Depiction of the Porsche-Piëch Clan’s Influence on Volkswagen 
 
1Percentage of voting rights 
Pictured representatives from the Porsche-Piëch family are (from the left): Dr. Louise Kiesling (VW AG 
supervisory board member), Wolfgang Porsche (VW AG and Porsche Automobil Holding SE supervisory board 
member; chairman of the supervisory board of Dr. Ing. H.c. F. Porsche AG) and Dr. Ferdinand Oliver Porsche 
(Porsche Automobil Holding SE supervisory board member). 
Source: Porsche SE, Volkswagen AG 
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Exhibit 9: Volkswagen’s Shareholder Structure as a Percentage of Subscribed Capital (As 
of December 31, 2018) 
 
Source: Volkswagen AG 
Exhibit 10: Distribution of Voting Rights at Volkswagen AG 
 








Porsche Holding SE Foreign Institutional Investors Qatar Holding LLC





Porsche Holding SE State of Lower Saxony
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Exhibit 11: Volkswagen’s Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) Sales Forecast and Scheduled 
Launch Dates of Selected BEVs  
 
Source: Volkswagen AG 
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Exhibit 12: Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board Composition as of December 31, 2018 
Name; Gender Background Representative of 
Shareholder Representatives 
Hans Dieter Pötsch; m 
Chairman  
Chairperson of Traton’s and Porsche Automobil 
Holding’s Supervisory Board 
Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE 
Dr. Hussain Ali Al-Abdulla; 
m  
Minister of State, Qatar Qatar Holding LLC 
Dr. Hessa Sultan Al-Jaber; f Chairwoman of the Supervisory Board of Malomatia 
Qatar, Doha  
Qatar Holding LLC 
Dr. Bernd Althusmann; m  Minister of Economic Affairs, Labor, Transport and 
Digitalization for the Federal State of Lower Saxony 
State of Lower Saxony 
Marianne Heiß; f Chief Financial Officer of BBDO Group (German 
Marketing Agency) 
Others 
Dr. Louise Kiesling; f  Businesswoman Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE 
Dr. Jur. Hans Michel Piëch; 
m  
Lawyer in private practice Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE 
Dr. Jur. Ferdinand Oliver 
Porsche; m  
Member of the Board of Management of Familie 
Porsche AG Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE 
Dr. Rer. Comm. Wolfgang 
Porsche; m  
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Porsche 
Automobil Holding SE 
Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE 
Stephan Weil; m  Minister-President of the Federal State of Lower 
Saxony 
State of Lower Saxony 
Employee Representatives 
Jörg Hofmann; m  
Deputy Chairman 
First Chairman of IG Metall (German Union) Works Council 
Birgit Dietze; f  First authorized representative of IG Metall Berlin 
(German Union) 
Dr. Jur. Hans-Peter Fischer; 
m  
Chairman of the Board of Management of Volkswagen 
Management Association 
Uwe Hück; m Chairman of the General and Group Works Councils of 
Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG 
Ulrike Jakob; f  Deputy Chairwoman of the Works Council of 
Volkswagen AG, Kassel plant 
Johan Järvklo; m  Secretary-General of the European and Global Group 
Works Council of Volkswagen AG 
Peter Mosch; m  Chairman of the General Works Council of AUDI AG 
Bertina Murkovic; f Chairwoman of the Works Council of Volkswagen 
Commercial Vehicles 
Bernd Osterloh; m  Chairman of the General and Group Works Councils of 
Volkswagen AG 
Athanasios Stimoniaris; m  Chairman of the Group Works Council of MAN SE 
and of the SE Works Council 
Werner Weresch; m  Chairman of the General and Group Works Councils of 
Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG 
Source: Volkswagen AG 
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Exhibit 13: Management Board Composition of Volkswagen as of June 14, 2019 
Name; Gender  Responsibilities Background 
Dr.-Ing. Herbert 
Diess; m 
Chairperson Diess obtained a doctorate in the field of assembly automation at Mu-
nich Technical University in 1987. He started his career in the auto-
motive supplier industry before joining BMW in 1996. In 2012, he 
joined BMW’s management board. Volkswagen recruited Diess in 
2015. Since then, he is part of Volkswagen’s management board and 




Integrity and Legal 
Affair 
Werner holds an economics degree and began her career in consulting 
before switching to BMW in 1996. After completing an international 
management trainee program, she worked at BMW Bank. In 2000, 
she switched to BMW’s audit team and eventually became head of 
Group Audit Financial Services. After working for MAN as Chief 
Audit Executive, she became head of Volkswagen Group’s Audit in 
2016. In 2017, she joined the management board.  
Andreas 
Renschler; m 
Chairperson of the 
Board of Management 
of TRATON SE 
Renschler completed an apprenticeship as a banker and holds degrees 
in business engineering and business administration. He began his ca-
reer at Daimler in 1988 and worked in multiple leadership positions. 
He spent nine years on the management board of Daimler’s truck di-
vision. Since 2015 he is a member of Volkswagen’s management 
board and Traton CEO. 
Gunnar Kilian Human Resources Kilian started his career in journalism and then worked in public rela-
tions and spokesperson positions for Volkswagen and the German 
Parliament. Since 2012, he is the general manager of the Group 
Works Council and joined the Group’s management board.  
Oliver Blume; 
m 
Chairman of the Board 
of Management of Por-
sche AG, Sport & Lux-
ury brand Group 
Blume holds a PhD in mechanical engineering from the Institute of 
Vehicle Technology at Tongji University, Shanghai, and has been 
with the Volkswagen Group since 1994. He started at Audi but also 
worked for the brands Volkswagen and Porsche. Blume is CEO of 





Sommer holds a PhD in engineering and worked at automotive sup-
pliers before joining Volkswagen’s management board in 2019. His 
positions included CEO of ZF Friedrichshafen AG, one of Germany’s 
largest automotive suppliers. 
Frank Witter; m Finance & IT Witter joined the Volkswagen Group in 1992 and was working in 
treasury positions in multiple entities. In 2002 he became CFO of 
Volkswagen in the USA and Canada. In 2006 he became CEO of the 
Group’s North American division. Since 2015 he is CFO of 
Volkswagen AG.  
Bram Schot; m Chairman of the Board 
of Management of 
AUDI AG, Premium 
brand Group 
Schot, born in the Netherlands, is the former CEO of Mercedes-
Benz’s Italian division. He joined Volkswagen in 2011 to oversee 
strategic procurement projects. His responsibilities at Volkswagen in-
cluded marketing and sales positions at Volkswagen Commercial Ve-
hicles and Audi. In 2019, he joined the board.  
Source: Volkswagen AG  
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Exhibit 14: German Corporate Governance Code Section 5.4.2 (As amended on February 
7th, 2017) 
“The Supervisory Board shall include what it considers to be an appropriate number of independent members, 
thereby taking into account the shareholder structure. Within the meaning of this recommendation, Supervisory 
Board members are to be considered non-independent in particular if they have a personal or business relationship 
with the corporation, its governing bodies, a controlling shareholder or a company affiliated with the controlling 
shareholder that may cause a substantial and not merely temporary conflict of interest. No more than two former 
members of the Management Board shall be members of the Supervisory Board. Members of the Supervisory 
Board shall not be members of governing bodies of, or exercise advisory functions at, significant competitors of 
the company.” 
Source: German Corporate Governance Code 
 
Exhibit 15: ESG Factors - Definition 
“ESG stands for Environmental, Social, and Governance. Investors are increasingly applying these non-financial 
factors as part of their analysis process to identify material risks and growth opportunities. ESG metrics are not 
commonly part of mandatory financial reporting, though companies are increasingly making disclosures in their 
annual report or in a standalone sustainability report.” 




Exhibit 16: Sustainalytics Environmental Peer Percentile Rank of Volkswagen in 
Comparison with other European Car Companies from January 2015 to June 2019 
 
Sustainalytics, the ESG research subsidiary of Morningstar, assigns an overall percentile ranking based on 
companies’ environmental, social and governance rating and relative to its industry peers. For the top 1%, the 
assigned percentile is 99%. For the bottom 1%, the assigned percentile is 1%. Aggregated ESG performance is 
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Exhibit 17: Sustainalytics Social Peer Percentile Rank of Volkswagen in Comparison with 
other European Car Companies from January 2015 to June 2019 
 
Please refer to Exhibit 16 for how to read the diagram.  
Source: Bloomberg 
Exhibit 18: Sustainalytics Governance Peer Percentile Rank of Volkswagen in Comparison 
with other European Car Companies from January 2015 to June 2019 
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Exhibit 19: MSCI ESG Rating of Volkswagen in Comparison with other European Car 
Manufacturers as of June, 2019 
 
Source: MSCI, Logos from the respective companies 
 
Exhibit 20: The Performance of the MSCI ACWI ESG Leaders Index against the MSCI 
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Exhibit 21: Trucks from the three manufacturing brands of Traton – Scania (left), 
Volkswagen Caminhões e Ônibus (center), and MAN 
Source: Traton SE 
Exhibit 22: Description of Traton’s Brands 
Scania: The Swedish truck manufacturer’s product portfolio mainly consisted of heavy- and medium-duty trucks 
and buses. In addition, the company sold industrial, marine, and power generation engines. Scania was leading the 
development of alternate drives in the Group. The company already offered a broad range of alternative fuel-driven 
vehicles that included ethanol and gas-powered trucks and buses and two hybrid trucks that could run fully loaded 
on an electric engine for up to 10 kilometers in restricted urban areas. Long-haul hybrid trucks and fully electric 
trucks were already in development. The company also offered a variety of digital solutions. Approximately 50% 
of the company’s rolling fleet in 2018 was connected and hence provided the company with various vehicle data. 
In 2018, Scania accounted for 41.4% of units sold in the Traton Group. In the IPO, the advising banks highlighted 
Scania as the group’s crown jewel due to its high profitability and good prospects through its expertise in 
alternative fuels ahead of stricter emission rules. 
MAN: Munich-based MAN manufactured trucks and buses, and vans, which made the company a full-range 
supplier of commercial vehicles. With 100,357 vehicles sold in 2018, MAN accounted for 43.1% of the group’s 
total unit sales. Like Scania, the company also manufactured diesel and natural gas engines and components for 
the Traton Group and other vehicle manufacturers. In terms of profitability, MAN lacked far behind its Swedish 
sibling, so the advising investment banks tried to pitch MAN as a turn-around story with lots of future potential if 
synergies could be achieved. 
Volkswagen Caminhões e Ônibus: VWCO mainly sold budget trucks under the Volkswagen brand and some 
MAN trucks. With that strategy, it became one of the largest truck manufacturers in South America. Its product 
offer consisted of tailor-made trucks for emerging markets, which offered good value for relatively little money. 
VWCO was continuously expanding into new developing markets such as Nicaragua and Ghana in the past five 
years.  
RIO: In 2017, RIO, a cloud-based connectivity platform, was launched as part of MAN before being established 
as a separate business unit in 2018. It offered a digital platform and aimed to connect all transportation chain 
participants through a cloud-based logistics ecosystem that included information and forecasting features. Through 
data collection and data-driven intelligence, an increase in overall efficiency, profitability, and sustainability was 
supposed to be achieved. Since 2017, most new MAN trucks in Europe offered access to the platform.  
Source: Bloomberg and Traton SE 
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Exhibit 23: Traton Group Structure 
 
The following table presents an overview of the Group’s significant subsidiaries: 
Legal name Seat Business Area 
Direct and/or 
indirect Interest 
1 MAN       
MAN SE Munich, Germany Holding 94.36%* 
  
  94.68%** 
MAN Truck & Bus SE Munich, Germany Trucks and Buses 100% 
MAN Truck & Bus Deutschland 
GmbH Munich, Germany Trucks and Buses 100% 
2 Scania      
Scania AB Södertälje, Sweden Holding   
Scania CV AB Södertälje, Sweden Trucks and Buses 100% 
3 Volkswagen Caminhões e 
Ônibus     
MAN Latin America Indústria e 
Comércio de Veiculos Ltda. Sao Paolo, Brazil Trucks and Buses 99.99%*** 
4 RIO     
TB Digital Services GmbH  Munich, Germany Digital Services 100% 
* Interest in capital  
**Voting Rights  
***0.01% held by Antonio Roberto Cortes, CEO of MAN Latin America, due to a mandatory legal requirement. 
Source: Traton SE 
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Exhibit 24: Traton Income Statement 
 Fiscal Year ended December 31, 
In Millions of EUR  2016 2017 2018 
Revenue 21,915  24,366  25,927  
 / Cost of Revenue (17,649) (19,653) (20,946) 
Gross Profit 4,266  4,713  4,981  
Other Operating Income 506  606  792  
 / Operating Expenses (4,045) (3,807) (4,260) 
Operating Income (Loss) 727  1,512  1,513  
Interest Income 79  91  83  
Income from Affiliates 17  74  209  
 / Interest Expense (298) (264) (245) 
 / Other Financial Result (32) (34) 6  
Pretax Income 493  1,379  1,566  
 / Income Tax Expense (Benefit) (297) (489) (415) 
Current Income Tax (424) (377) (449) 
Deferred Income Tax 127  (112) 34  
Income (Loss) from Continued Operations 196  890  1,151  
Income from Discontinued Operations 22  149  250  
Income (Loss) Incl. Minority Interest 218  1,039  1,401  
 / Minority Interest (10) (10) (11) 
Net Income 208  1,029  1,390  
 / Other Adjustments 0  0  0  
Net Income Attributable to Traton SE Sharehold-





Exhibit 25: Traton Balance Sheet 
In Millions of EUR  As of December 31, As of March 31, 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Assets         
Noncurrent assets 24,344  25,337  25,851  27,317  
Intangible assets 7,055  7,019  6,597  6,597  
Property, plant and equipment 5,940  6,003  5,469  6,465  
Lease assets 5,840  6,103  6,599  6,746  
Financial services receivables 3,237 3,805  4,212  4,366  
Investments, equity-accounted investments and other equity in-
vestments, other receivables and financial assets 2,271  2,407  2,975  3,142  
Current assets 16,916  17,428  20,533  16,025 
Inventories 5,405 5,781  4,822  5,500  
Financial services receivables 2,112  2,319  2,688  2,904  
Other receivables and financial assets 4,409  4,683  9,769  3,667  
Marketable securities 84  51  98  1,100  
Cash, cash equivalents 4,907  4,594 2,997  2,854  
Assets held for sale - - 157  - 
Total assets 41,260  42,765  46,384  43,341 
          
Equity and liabilities         
Equity 10,931  11,810  16,801  13,313  
Equity attributable to Traton SE shareholders 10,829  11,702  16,799  13,078  
Noncontrolling interests 102  108  2  235  
Noncurrent liabilities 11,087 13,238 13,217 13,605  
Noncurrent Financial liabilities  3,555  5,545  5,449  5,604  
Provisions for pensions 1,526  1,541  1,506  1,623  
Other liabilities 6,008  6,151  6,259  6,377  
Current liabilities 19,241  17,717  16,366  16,424  
Put options and compensation rights granted to noncontrolling in-
terest shareholders 3,849  3,795  1,827  - 
Current Financial liabilities  5,485  3,426  5,366  6,019  
Trade payables 3,362  3,507  2,969  2,927  
Other liabilities 6,546  6,989  6,083  7,478  
Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale – – 123  – 
Total equity and liabilities 41,260  42,765  46,384  43,341  
Source: Traton SE 
Exhibit 26: Traton’s Industrial Business Net Financial Debt 
 As of December 31, As of March 31,  
In Millions of EUR  2018 2019 Change 
Cash, cash equivalents 2,997  2,854  (143) 
Marketable securities 202* 1,100  898  
Gross liquidity 3,200  3,954  754  
Total borrowings (10,814) (11,623) (809) 
Net liquidity / (net financial debt) (7,615) (7,669) (54) 
of which in the Industrial Business segment 227  604  377  
*Differs from balance sheet item as loans to affiliated companies are included as well 
Source: Traton SE 
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Exhibit 27: Traton Cash Flow Statement 
 Fiscal Year ended December 31, 
In Millions of EUR  2016 2017 2018 
Cash from Operating Activities       
+ Net Income 208  1,029  1,390  
+ Depreciation & Amortization 1,866  1,941  1,893  
+ Non-Cash Items 180  (349) (987) 
+ Change in Non-Cash Working Capital (1,614) (1,849) (1,848) 
+ (Increase) / Decrease in Inventories (353) (482) (632) 
+ Increase / (Decrease) in Other (1,261) (1,367) (1,216) 
Net Cash From Discontinued Operations 118  (46) (72) 
Cash from Operating Activities 758  726  376  
        
Cash from Investing Activities       
+ Change in Fixed & Intangible Assets (1,014) (806) (866) 
+ Net Change in Long Term Investment (7) (265) (17) 
+ Net Cash From Acquisitions & Divestitures (87) 31  351  
+ Other Investing Activities (349) (147) (349) 
+ Net Cash From Discontinued Operations (186) (174) (184) 
Cash from Investing Activities (1,643) (1,361) (1,065) 
        
Cash from Financing Activities       
+ Dividends Paid 0  0  0  
+ Cash From (Repayment) Debt (2) (2) 0  
+ Increase in Capital Stock 0  311  0  
+ Decrease in Capital Stock 0  0  0  
+ Other Financing Activities (757) 91  (858) 
+ Net Cash From Discontinued Operations (16) (8) (7) 
Cash from Financing Activities (775) 392  (865) 
        
+ Effect of Foreign Exchange Rates (8) (71) (48) 
        




Exhibit 28: Traton’s Sales Revenue by Operating Unit within the Industrial Business 
Segment (before consolidation effects) 
 
Fiscal Year ended 
December 31, 
In Millions of EUR 2016 2017 2018 
Scania V&S 10,989 12,427 12,982 
Vehicles 6,720 7,430 8,326 
Aftersales* 2,282 2,462 2,592 
Others** 1,987 2,535 2,064 
MAN T&B 9,247 10,022 10,814 
Vehicles 5,642 5,977 6,688 
Aftersales* 1,869 1,965 2,070 
Others** 1,736 2,080 2,056 
VWCO 864 1,162 1,421 
Vehicles 747 1,014 1,290 
Aftersales* 91 101 96 
Others** 26 47 35 
Reconciliation (815) (755) (710) 
Total Group Revenue 21,915  24,366  25,927  
*Includes genuine parts and workshop services  
** Includes used vehicles, engines, powertrains and parts deliveries, leasing business, interest and similar income 
and other sales revenue (including sales revenue from hedging transactions) 
Source: Traton SE 
Exhibit 29: Traton’s Operating Profit by Segment and Operating Unit 
 
Fiscal Year ended 
December 31, 
In Millions of EUR 2016 2017 2018 
Industrial Business 596  1,368  1,346  
Scania V&S operating profit* 555  1,167  1,207  
MAN T&B operating profit* 405  526  402  
VWCO operating profit* (192) (103) 28  
Financial Services 105  111  138  
Other Segments  27  33  34  
Reconciliation 0  0  (6) 
Total Group operating profit 727  1,512  1,513  
* Before consolidation within Industrial Business segment 
Source: Traton SE 
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Exhibit 31:Traton’s Global Expansion as of June 2019 
 
Note: SoP = Start of Production; LoI = Letter of Intent; JV = Joint Venture 
1Market share of Navistar Canada and USA.  
2 Market share of CNHTC (parent company of Sinotruk) in China (including Hong Kong).  
3 Market share of Hino in Japan and South East Asia (Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam). 
Source: Traton SE 
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Exhibit 32: Traton’s Sales Revenue by Region in Fiscal Year 2018 
*EU28+2 region consists of EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland. 
**Including sales revenue from hedging transactions not assigned to regions. 
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Exhibit 33: Performance of the Volkswagen AG Preferred Stock and the NASDAQ Global 
Auto Index from January 2012 to June 2019 Including Key Events 
 
The performance of the respective securities is presented as an index with a start value of 100. The NASDAQ 
Global Auto Index is a market capitalization weighted index of global automotive manufacturing corporations. 
The stock and index performance is adjusted for dividends and stock splits.  
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Exhibit 34: Arndt Ellinghorst’s Sum of the Parts (SOTP) Analysis of Volkswagen 
 
Source: Evercore ISI Research 
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Exhibit 35: Commercial Vehicle Industry: Comparable Companies 






Motors Navistar Paccar 
Currency SEK USD EUR USD JPY USD USD 
Exchange Rate as of 
June 3, 2019 (EUR/X) 10.62 1.12 1.00 1.12 121.49 1.12 1.12 
In Million (Except JPY in Billion and %) 
Market Capitalization 285,034.78 11,850.11 49,720.70 47,129.47 495.29 3,080.94 22,944.94 
Enterprise Value* 400,117.78 13,928.11 37,097.70 61,698.47 750.29 5,097.69 19,130.24 
Revenue 390,834.00 29,706.00 167,362.00 36,193.00 1,981.33 10,250.00 23,495.70 
Revenue Growth in % 17.46 7.24 1.95 16.85 7.80 19.60 20.76 
Depreciation and 
Amortization  18,439.00 1,337.00 6,305.00 763.00 58.54 211.00 1,054.10 
Interest Expense 1,658.00 812.00 793.00 374.00 5.89 327.00 166.50 
Pretax Income 32,148.00 1,466.00 10,595.00 4,085.00 82.52 420.00 2,810.20 
Net Income 24,897.00 1,068.00 7,249.00 3,345.00 54.91 340.00 2,195.10 
*Enterprise Value is adjusted for net debt of financial service subsidiaries 
AB Volvo is one of the world’s largest commercial vehicle manufacturers. The Swedish truck company’s portfolio 
consists of trucks, buses, construction equipment, marine and industrial engines. It sells its products under ten 
different brands, including Volvo, UD Trucks, Prevost, Mack, and Renault Trucks. The company generates a 
majority of its sales in Europe and should not be confused with Volvo Cars, a passenger car brand that it sold in 
1999 and which now belongs to the Chinese automotive company Geely. 
CNH Industrials is well known in Europe for its truck and bus brand Iveco, but it is also one of the world’s largest 
manufacturers of agricultural vehicles. The UK-headquartered company produces vehicles for almost every 
commercial application field, including construction vehicles and firefighting trucks. Powertrains and engines also 
belong to CNH Industrial’s product portfolio.  
Daimler is the world’s largest truck manufacturer of trucks and buses. While the commercial vehicle business 
accounts for about a third of Daimler’s total revenue, more than half is generated by the premium passenger car 
brand Mercedes-Benz.  
General Dynamics manufactures all sorts of military and defense vehicles. The US company’s portfolio ranges 
from tanks and (nuclear) submarines to military jets. It is one of the largest defense contractors in the world.  
Hino Motors, Japan’s oldest truck manufacturer, is dominating its home market’s commercial vehicle sector. 
While the company’s operations are mainly focused on the Asian markets, it also manufactures and sells its trucks 
and buses in North and South America. 
Navistar is a US-based manufacturer of buses, heavy-duty trucks, military vehicles, and diesel engines, which it 
mainly sells in North America. Its parts distribution network is one of the largest in the US.  
Paccar focuses on manufacturing medium and heavy-duty trucks primarily in its home market, the United States, 
where the company generates about half of its revenue. 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Exhibit 36: Passenger Car Industry: Comparable Companies 




Motors Renault Tesla Toyota 
Currency EUR EUR EUR USD USD EUR USD JPY 
Exchange Rate on 
June 3, 2019 (EUR/X) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.12 1.00 1.12 121.49 
In Million (Except 
JPY in Billion and %)                
Market Capitalization 39,835.71 23,786.64 19,878.92 38,339.54 47,799.84 16,042.93 31,877.29 20,697.19 
Enterprise Value* 66,753.09 24,796.18 19,738.71 27,969.54 50,936.84 14,281.93 43,814.34 36,236.21 
Revenue 96,855.00 3,420.32 110,412.00 160,338.00 147,049.00 57,419.00 21,461.27 30,225.68 
Revenue Growth in % -1.45 0.10 4.43 2.27 1.00 -2.30 82.51 2.88 
Depreciation & 
Amortization 8,601.00 288.75 5,507.00 8,413.00 13,669.00 3,245.00 1,901.05 1,792.38 
Interest Expense 324.00 22.53 681.00 1,228.00 655.00 373.00 663.07 28.08 
Pretax Income 9,627.00 802.94 4,108.00 4,345.00 8,549.00 4,174.00 -1,004.75 2,285.47 
Net Income 6,974.00 784.68 3,608.00 3,677.00 8,014.00 3,302.00 -976.09 1,882.87 
*Enterprise Value is adjusted for net debt of financial service subsidiaries  
BMW is one of the world’s largest premium passenger car manufacturers. With its brands, BMW, Mini, and Rolls-
Royce, the German automotive company sold 2.5m cars and motorcycles in 2018. European and Asian markets 
account for large junks of its sales. 
Ferrari is a well-known Italian luxury sports car brand and sold only a little more than nine thousand vehicles in 
2018. However, Ferrari’s cars’ price tags start at around 300 thousand EUR, making the company very profitable.  
Fiat Chrysler sells its passenger cars globally under several different brands, including Alfa Romeo, Chrysler, 
Fiat, Dodge, Jeep, and Maserati. However, it generates the majority of its sales in North America. The broad brand 
portfolio resulted from the merger of US-American automotive company Chrysler and its Italian competitor Fiat.  
Ford Motor Company is deeply rooted in the United States, where it generates most of its sales through its 
passenger car brands Ford and Lincoln.  
General Motors became one of the world’s largest automotive companies by dominating the US market, where 
it generated about 80% of its sales in 2018. The company sells its passenger cars under the brands Buick, Cadillac, 
Chevrolet, and GMC.  
Renault is a French automotive company that sells passenger cars under brands such as Renault, Dacia, and Lada. 
In 2001 it parted from its truck business by selling it to AB Volvo. 
Tesla disrupted the passenger car industry by producing electric sports cars that have unique digital and 
autonomous driving features built in. Despite its lofty valuation, the company’s structures were still quite start-up-
like in many regards, and it continued to be loss-making during the fiscal year of 2018.  
Toyota, after Volkswagen the world’s second-largest automaker, sold 9m vehicles in the fiscal year ending March 
2019. The Japanese company has an extensive product portfolio that caters to several different customer segments. 
It is world-leading in hybrid-electric propulsion technology, which it uses in its popular Toyota Prius car. 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Exhibit 37: Volkswagen exclusive of Traton pro forma Income Statement 
 Fiscal Year ended December 31, 
In Millions of EUR  2016 2017 2018 
Revenue 195,352  205,184  209,922  
 / Cost of Revenue (158,621) (166,348) (168,554) 
Gross Profit 36,731  38,836  41,368  
Other Operating Income 8,805  9,510  9,695  
 / Operating Expenses (39,160) (36,040) (38,656) 
Operating Income (Loss) 6,376  12,306  12,407  
Interest Income 563  860  884  
Income from Affiliates 3,480  3,408  3,160  
 / Interest Expense (1,032) (2,053) (1,302) 
 / Other Financial Result (2,588) (2,227) (1,072) 
Pretax Income 6,799  12,294  14,077  
 / Income Tax Expense (Benefit) (1,616) (1,721) (3,075) 
Current Income Tax (2,850) (2,828) (3,084) 
Deferred Income Tax 1,234  1,107  9  
Income (Loss) from Continued Operations 5,183  10,573  11,002  
Income from Discontinued Operations (22) (149) (250) 
Income (Loss) Incl. Minority Interest 5,161  10,424  10,752  
 / Minority Interest 0  0  (6) 
Net Income 5,161  10,424  10,746  
 / Attributable to Volkswagen AG Hybrid Capital 
Investors (225) (274) (309) 
Net Income Attributable to Volkswagen AG 
Shareholders 4,936  10,150  10,437  
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Exhibit 38: Volkswagen exclusive of Traton Depreciation and Amortization  
 Fiscal Year ended December 31, 
In Millions of EUR  2016 2017 2018 




Exhibit 39: Volkswagen exclusive of Traton pro forma Balance Sheet 
In Millions of EUR  
As of December 31, 
As of 
March 31, 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Assets         
Noncurrent assets 229,666  236,744  248,769  257,579  
Intangible assets 55,544  56,400  58,016  58,188  
Property, plant and equipment 48,093  49,240  52,161  55,774  
Lease assets 32,599  33,151  36,946  38,608  
Financial services receivables 65,165  69,444  74,480  77,236  
Investments, equity-accounted investments and other eq-
uity investments, other receivables and financial assets 28,266  28,509  27,165  27,775  
Current assets 138,806  142,684  163,003  170,301  
Inventories 33,573  34,634  40,923  43,977  
Financial services receivables 47,561  50,826  51,528  53,346  
Other receivables and financial assets 25,877  27,357  27,788  37,654  
Marketable securities 17,436  15,888  16,982  15,922  
Cash, cash equivalents  14,358  13,863  25,941  19,402  
Assets held for sale – 115  (157) – 
Total assets 368,472  379,428  411,772  427,881  
          
Equity and liabilities         
Equity 81,979  97,267  100,541  104,194  
Noncurrent liabilities 128,219  139,488  159,629  172,624  
Noncurrent Financial liabilities  62,803  76,083  95,677  103,207  
Provisions for pensions 31,486  31,189  31,591  35,522  
Other liabilities 33,928  32,217  32,364  33,896  
Current liabilities 158,274  142,672  151,602  151,062  
Put options and compensation rights granted to noncon-
trolling interest shareholders – – 26  – 
Current Financial liabilities  82,976  78,418  84,391  77,901  
Trade payables 19,432  19,539  20,638  21,478  
Other liabilities 55,865  44,716  46,544  51,684  
Total equity and liabilities 368,472  379,428  411,772  427,881  
Source: Volkswagen AG and Traton SE 
 
Exhibit 40: Volkswagen (exclusive of Traton)’s Industrial Business Net Financial Debt 
 As of December 31, As of March 31,  
In Millions of EUR  2018 2019 Change 
Cash, cash equivalents 25,941  19,402  (6,539) 
Marketable securities 16,878  15,922  15,720  
Gross liquidity 42,818  35,324  (7,494) 
Total borrowings (180,069) (181,108) (1,039) 
Net liquidity / (net financial debt) (137,250) (145,784) (8,534) 
of which in the Industrial Business segment 24,635  16,472  (8,163) 
Source: Volkswagen AG and Traton SE 
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Exhibit 41:Traton’s Supervisory Board Composition as of June 14, 2019 
Member; Gender Background Representative of 
Shareholder Representatives 
Hans Dieter Pötsch; 
m   
Chairperson 
Chairperson of VW’s and Porsche Automobil Holding SE’s 
Supervisory Board  
VW AG / Porsche 
Automobil Holding 
SE 
Dr. Manfred Döss; 
m 
Member of the Management Board of Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE; General Counsel of Volkswagen AG 
Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE 
Gunnar Kilian; m Member of the Management Board of VW AG VW AG 
Dr. Albert Xaver 
Kirchmann; m 
Self-Employed Chief Executive Advisor Others 
Dr Julia Kuhn-
Piëch; f 
Real Estate Manager Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE 
Nina Macpherson; f Member of the Board of Directors of Scania AB Others 
Dr. Dr. Christian 
Porsche; m 








Member of the Management Board of VW AG VW AG 






Chairperson of the Group Works Council of MAN SE and of the 




Expert consultant of the Group Works Council 
Mari Carlquist; f Representative of the Federation of Salaried Employees in 
Industry and Services at Scania 
Jürgen Kerner; m 
 
Executive Member of the Executive Board of IG Metall (German 
Union) 
Lisa Lorentzon; f Chairperson of the Union for University Graduates at Scania AB 
Bo Luthin; m Senior safety officer at Scania Södertälje; Coordinator for IF 
Metall (Swedish Union) 
Michael Lyngsie; m Chairperson of IF Metall at Scania (Swedish Union) 
Bernd Osterloh; m Chairperson of the Group Works Council of Volkswagen AG 
Karina Schnur; f Secretary of the Works Council of IG Metall (German Union) 
Steffen Zieger; m Chairman of the General Works Council of MAN Truck & Bus 
Deutschland GmbH 
 
Source: Traton SE 
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Exhibit 42: Management Board Composition of Traton as of June 14, 2019 
Name; Gender  Responsibilities Background 
Andreas 
Renschler; m 
Chairperson Renschler completed an apprenticeship as a banker and holds degrees 
in business engineering and business administration. He began his ca-
reer at Daimler in 1988 and worked in multiple leadership positions. 
He spent nine years on the management board of Daimler’s truck divi-
sion. Since 2015 he is a member of Volkswagen’s management board 







Cortes, born in Brazil, was working in the automotive industry since 
1979. He started to work for a South American Ford and Volkswagen 
joint-venture in 1986. In 1994 he became Volkswagen’s corporate 
controller for South America. In 1998 he began to work in 
Volkswagen’s commercial vehicle unit and became president of MAN 




MAN Drees holds an MBA from Portland State University, Oregon, USA. 
He worked as a consultant before joining Daimler in 1996. His posi-
tions there included head of corporate strategy for commercial and 
head of commercial vehicles controlling. In 2006 he joined a British 
investment company and in 2015, he joined Volkswagen as CEO of 
MAN.   
Henrik 
Henriksson; m 
Scania Henriksson, born in Sweden, holds an MBA from Stern School of 
Business, New York, USA, and Edinburgh University, UK. He joined 
Scania AB in 1997 as a management trainee. In 2016, he was ap-




Resources and IT 
Intra earned a doctorate in mechanical engineering at RWTH Aachen. 
He started his career as a production engineer at MAN in 2001. He is a 







Levin, born in Sweden, holds a Master of Science degree in mechani-
cal engineering. He started his career as a marketing trainee at Scania 
in 1994. He was appointed as Scania’s executive vice president of 





Schulz started his career at Daimler in 1999. He held various positions 
in the finance, controlling and risk management department of Daimler 
trucks. Between 2008 and 2011, he worked as a controlling director for 
purchasing, production, and development at Japanese Mitsubishi Fuso 
Truck & Bus. Before joining Traton’s management board in 2017, he 
worked in Daimler’s passenger car division.  
Source: Traton SE 
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Exhibit 43: Andreas Renschler’s (Traton CEO) Remuneration as Described in Traton’s 
IPO Prospectus 
Non-performance-based Salary 
“For Mr. Renschler, the annual base compensation under his service agreement with Volkswagen AG amounts to 
EUR 1,350,000 (gross). The annual base compensation is reviewed at regular intervals by (…) the supervisory 
board of Volkswagen AG.” 
Performance-based Variable Remuneration Components 
“The variable remuneration consists of the following variable components. For Mr. Renschler, the supervisory 
board of Volkswagen AG may cap the performance-based variable remuneration components in the event of 
extraordinary developments. Furthermore, the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG has the right to grant Mr. 
Renschler a reasonable additional bonus payment in the event of outstanding, exceptional performance of Mr. 
Renschler, if such bonus payment is (pursuant to the discretion of the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG) in 
the interest of Volkswagen AG and provided there is a future-related benefit for Volkswagen AG from granting 
such bonus payment. The overall maximum compensation amount for Mr. Renschler is applicable on such 
additional bonus payments and the overall-payments to Mr. Renschler have to be in an appropriate proportion to 
the position of Volkswagen AG.” 
Profit Bonus: “The Profit Bonus of Mr. Renschler is governed by his service agreement with Volkswagen AG and 
the remuneration terms and conditions for board members of Volkswagen AG. The target amount in case of 100% 
target achievement amounts to EUR 1,350,000 (gross) p.a. and is based upon the result for the respective fiscal 
year of Volkswagen AG. Operating profit achieved by the Volkswagen Group plus the proportionate operating 
profit of the Chinese joint ventures form half of the basis for the Profit Bonus, with operating return on sales 
achieved by the Volkswagen Group making up the second half. Each of the two components of the Profit Bonus 
will only be payable if certain thresholds are reached or exceeded. The calculated payment amount for the Profit 
Bonus of Mr. Renschler may be individually reduced (multiplier of 0.8) or increased (multiplier of 1.2) by up to 
20% by the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG, taking into account the degree of achievement of individual 
targets agreed between the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG and Mr. Renschler, as well as the success of the 
full management board of Volkswagen AG in transforming the Volkswagen Group by transferring employees to 
new areas of activity.” 
Long-term Incentive (LTI): “Mr. Renschler participates in the LTI program for members of the management board 
of Volkswagen AG (“LTI-VW”) which is in general comparable to the LTI of the Company. An LTI-VW award 
is granted to Mr. Renschler annually which is subject to a performance share plan of Volkswagen (“Performance 
Share Plan-VW”). The annual target amount from the Performance Share Plan-VW for Mr. Renschler is currently 
EUR 1,800,000 (gross) and stipulated by the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG. 
Each Performance Period of the Performance Share Plan-VW has a term of three years. At the time the LTI-VW 
is granted, the annual target amount under the LTI-VW is converted on the basis of the initial reference price of 
Volkswagen’s preferred shares into Performance Shares of Volkswagen AG, which are allocated to Mr. Renschler 
purely for calculation purposes. The conversion is performed based on the unweighted average of the closing 
prices of Volkswagen’s preferred shares for the last 30 trading days preceding January 1 of a given fiscal year. At 
the end of each year, the number of Performance Shares is determined definitively for one-third of the three-year 
Performance Period based on the degree of target achievement for the annual earnings per Volkswagen preferred 
share (EPS – earnings per share per preferred share in EUR). A prerequisite for this is that a threshold is reached 
which is set by the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG. A cash settlement is made at the end of the three-year 
term of each Performance Share Plan-VW. The payment amount corresponds to the final number of determined 
Performance Shares, multiplied by the closing reference price at the end of the three-year period plus a dividend 
equivalent for the relevant term. The closing reference price is the unweighted average of the closing prices for 
Volkswagen’s preferred shares for the 30 trading days preceding the last day of the three-year performance period. 
The payment amount under the Performance Share Plan-VW is limited to 200% of the target amount.” 
Source: Traton SE 
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Exhibit 45: Real GDP Growth and Forecasted GDP Growth in the Euro Area in % 
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Exhibit 46: Investment Banks Involved in Traton’s IPO 
 
Source: Traton SE 
 
  
